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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Although summary judgment was not always favored, the 1986 tri2
logy has transformed the device into a widely accepted and encour3
aged means of adjudicating without trial. Aimed to preserve judicial
4
resources by “filtering out cases not worthy of trial,” summary judgment generally serves as the post-pleading analog to Federal Rule of
5
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows for pre-trial dismissal for fail6
ure to state a claim. Thus, summary judgment generally occurs after
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See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1904 (1998)
(describing summary judgment’s “difficult infancy” and the subsequent caution with
which judges utilized the procedure prior to the Court’s revitalization of it in 1986).
As used in this Comment, the term “trilogy” refers to the Court’s decisions in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 1040–41 (2003) (explaining that the 1986 trilogy “collectively forge[s] a new,
stronger role for the motion,” and that Celotex in particular represents “strong advocacy of
summary judgment as a tool to promote judicial efficiency”).
Id. at 1041; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (noting that the “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy.
and inexpensive determination of every action’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted” is a defense that may be presented in a motion).
There are, to be sure, considerable differences between the two procedures; 12(b)(6) is
concerned with whether the facts, if true, represent a cognizable legal claim while the
summary judgment inquiry is focused on the existence (or lack) of material factual issues.
In terms of substantive similarity, summary judgment is most like the motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the Court has expressly recognized as much. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (noting that the summary judgment standard “mirrors the standard
for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)”).
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discovery and recognizes that going behind the pleadings can estab7
lish that triable issues do not, in fact, exist.
While the 1986 “trilogy” redefined the rules governing the summary judgment procedure by “providing a logical framework for de8
ciding how and when it can be used,” the determination still is, in
9
many respects, a product of judicial discretion. This Comment analyzes the extent to which the discretion inherent in the standard provides an avenue for judges to distort it, and evaluates the constitutional consequences of doing so. Specifically, wrongful application of
the summary judgment standard could run afoul of the Seventh
Amendment guarantee to “preserve[]” the right to a jury trial in cases
10
at law. Although it is well-settled that summary judgment does not
11
generally violate the Seventh Amendment, this verity is a mere
7

8
9

10

11

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (noting that responding party must not “rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading” in responding to a moving party’s motion for summary judgment).
Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 787 (1988).
See Miller, supra note 3, at 1045 (stating that summary judgment could be conceived as
transforming judges into “pretrial factfinders”). Some have criticized the degree of judicial discretion the trilogy affords judges vis-à-vis the jury which would otherwise (and ordinarily does) exercise control over factual matters. See, e.g., Daniel P. Collins, Note,
Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1988) (noting that the summary judgment standard, which inquires into what a rational jury would
do, affords too much discretion to judges in some contexts). While these concerns relate
to the propriety of the standard itself based on the discretion it affords judges, a more
subtle issue is the question of what discretion judges should have in applying the standard—that is, whether or not summary judgment must be granted when its requirements
are met; this issue remains unresolved. See Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
91, 104 (2002) (noting that “[f]ederal courts of appeals are currently split over whether
judges must grant summary judgment if it is technically appropriate”).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. This article does not delve into the due process concerns that
would be implicated by arbitrary summary judgment grants. For a brief discussion of that
issue, see Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 771–73.
Most scholars note that the constitutionality of summary judgment in the face of the Seventh Amendment was definitively settled by the Supreme Court in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902). See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 1019 (noting that the
Fidelity & Deposit Co. Court accepted the constitutionality of summary judgment in cases
where a jury trial right would otherwise exist). This view has recently been questioned,
however. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 139 (2007) (noting that the “conventional wisdom . . . that the Supreme Court settled the issue [of summary judgment’s constitutionality] a century ago in Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. United States. . . . is wrong”). In any event, others have defended summary judgment’s constitutionality by analogizing to the constitutional propriety of the judgment as
a matter of law standard which—as noted supra note 6—mirrors the summary judgment
standard. See Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 772 (noting that “[t]here is no need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ by investigating the question whether summary judgment should never be
granted, regardless of the circumstances, in a case in which the right to jury trial exists”
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product of the fact that the Seventh Amendment does not extend to
cases where the summary judgment standard is met—that is, where
12
there are no material factual issues to be tried. Thus, the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of a right to trial by jury is violated by grants
of summary judgment where there are “genuine issue[s] as
13
to . . . material fact[s]” and a right to jury trial exists, because such
grants entail a judge deciding questions reserved for the jury.
To explore whether the Seventh Amendment is violated in practice, this Comment examines cases in which summary judgment is
granted, where strict application of the standard would likely result in
the case proceeding to a jury trial. It does so by examining Fourth
Amendment excessive force cases because such claims involve highly
14
15
factual inquiries, frequently entail disputes as to historical fact and,
at least in cases where the only evidence adduced is one’s own say16
17
so, are likely to be suits that would fail if they reached a jury. Inap-

12

13
14

15

16
17

because “[t]hat fundamental matter has long been decided in the context of the directed
verdict [in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943)]”).
See Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that “a grant of summary judgment does not compromise the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial right because
that right exists only with respect to genuinely disputed issues of material fact” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court, in Fidelity & Deposit Co., reached a similar conclusion by noting that the standard “prescribes the means of making an issue.” 187 U.S. at 320. For the
reasons stated supra note 11, it is not (necessarily) clear whether this definitively settles
the constitutional question with respect to summary judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (noting that the excessive force determination under the Fourth Amendment involves consideration of whether the force “used
to effect a particular seizure [was] reasonable under the Fourth Amendment [through] a
careful balancing of the ‘nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))). Excessive force cases often bring
about qualified immunity defenses; as discussed further infra Part II, this inquiry serves as
a separate step with respect to the Graham constitutional inquiry and is also, at least in
some cases, highly factual. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (noting that the
constitutional question of excessive force is distinct from the question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity).
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (noting that the plaintiff’s version of the facts
“unsurprisingly” differs considerably from the defendant’s in Fourth Amendment excessive force suit); see also infra note 79.
I use this term in this Comment to refer to both direct evidence and the functional
equivalent adduced via indirect, circumstantial evidence.
See Smith v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 7576, 2005 WL 1026551, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 3,
2005) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff’s sole evidence of defendant’s complicity in property destruction was plaintiff’s own deposition alleging as much, but cautioning plaintiff about the ability of the case to succeed at trial). Although the Smith
Court appropriately adhered to the rule that summary judgment may not be granted for
a defendant where a jury could—but almost certainly would not—find for the plaintiff, see
Hossaini v. W. Mo. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that summary
judgment may not be granted “merely because [the court] believes the nonmoving party
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propriately granting summary judgment in such cases, then, is a particularly attractive option for the federal judge with an otherwise
18
crowded docket.
This Comment concludes that application of summary judgment
in practice has the propensity to diverge from its legal standard in a
way that brings question to its ostensibly settled constitutional basis—
at least in factually intensive inquiries. The Comment continues in
this Part by: (1) more fully discussing the summary judgment standard along with the device’s history, and (2) discussing when there is
a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Part II outlines the excessive force standard, and addresses the constitutional implications
of wrongful summary judgment grants by analyzing four instructive
cases in detail. Finally, Part III discusses the policy considerations
behind inappropriate summary judgment grants, and how judicial efficiency considerations bear on the constitutional violations the
summary judgment standard may, at times, allow.
A. The Summary Judgment Standard and Its History
19

Promulgated in 1938, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if “the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
20
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” While
debates about the scope and constitutional propriety of the summary

18

19

20

will lose at trial”); Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1980) (summary judgment may not be granted “even if the trial judge is convinced plaintiffs will eventually
lose”), it is not hard to conceive of a scenario in which a trial judge could, sensing that a
plaintiff would not be able to convince a jury that he or she is entitled to a verdict, grant
summary judgment to avoid (what could thus be viewed as) a senseless trial. Perhaps for
this reason, objective data indicates that summary judgment is disproportionately granted
in civil rights cases—a category which includes excessive force suits. See FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., ESTIMATES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACTIVITY IN FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 6 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf (reporting that summary judgment is granted in seventy percent of civil rights cases in which
it is sought although the corresponding figures for other claims are lower).
See Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital Resource in the
Era of Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269, 1291 (2005) (stating that “caseloads are rising faster than the rate of appointments of new district court judges to handle
them”). This is not to say, of course, that every inappropriate grant of summary judgment is exercised for purely docket-clearing purposes.
The rules governing summary judgment were amongst the 1938 rules’ major procedural
innovations. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, The Celotex Initial Burden Standard and an Opportunity to “Revivify” Rule 56, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 295, 298 (2008) (“The summary judgment
rule was an integral part of the 1938 rule package . . . .”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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21

judgment standard continue to this day, there was, from the beginning, a clear ideological divide about the standard which manifested
itself in a string of Second Circuit opinions authored by Judges
22
23
Charles Clark and Jerome Frank.
While the 1986 trilogy has clarified the law governing the sum24
mary judgment standard, the debate between Judges Clark and
Frank continues today because the “disagreement . . . offers a penetrating preview of the extreme versions of the pro- and anti-summary
25
judgment positions . . . among current judges.” The debate, in essence, revolved around whether summary judgment should be limited merely to “those cases where there was not the ‘slightest doubt’
26
about the . . . facts.” Judge Clark urged a more expansive view of the
standard, while Judge Frank believed it should be restricted so as to
27
preserve the constitutional right to jury trial.
Even before the 1986 trilogy reformed the summary judgment
28
29
standard, Judge Clark’s expansive view had won the day. Summary
judgment, however, was fundamentally limited in the wake of the
Frank-Clark debate because judges were very cautious in granting it—
particularly in the “presumptively off-limit areas [of] antitrust, patents, negligence, civil rights, and broadly conceived categories labeled ‘important public issues’ or ‘complex cases,’ . . . because such
areas disproportionately involved questions of credibility, motive,
30
state of mind, and intent.” More importantly, though, the Court’s
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30

See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 139.
It is worth noting that Judge Clark himself played an integral role in the development of
the 1938 Rules. For a personal, retrospective account of that process, see Charles E.
Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938–1958, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1958).
For a fuller discussion of the infamous Clark-Frank debate, see Wald, supra note 1, at
1898–1905. See also Marcy J. Levine, Summary Judgment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY L.J. 171, 173–80 (1988); Miller, supra
note 3, at 1019–24.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Wald supra note 1, at 1903; see also id. at 1899 (noting that the divergent views of Judges
Frank and Clark “showed not what summary judgment was meant to be, but what, unchecked, it could turn into”).
Id. at 1899.
See id. at 1903 (explaining that “Judge Frank represented a staunchly projury . . . view . . . . valu[ing] the preservation of jury trials almost for their own
sake . . . . [while] Judge Clark leaned towards an unabashedly pro-elitist position, worrying that the surrender of too much power to unsophisticated jurors with their ‘musically
naive’ ears would overwhelm the fine symphony of justice in a chaotic cacophony of the
common” (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479–80 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting))).
See supra note 3.
Wald, supra note 1, at 1904.
Id.
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decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. crippled the standard by placing an onerous burden on moving parties when it held summary
judgment to be inappropriate because the moving party had “failed
31
to show the absence of any disputed material fact.”
While the
Adickes decision could be understood as a “civil rights case that the
32
Court did not want to dispose of without trial,” it was read by lower
courts to impose a clear burden on moving parties “to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact in order to obtain summary
33
judgment.”
The 1986 trilogy represents the strengthened, modern view of the
34
summary judgment standard. While each of the individual cases reflects a more expansive view of the standard than that previously believed to be appropriate, they collectively form a coherent set of
guidelines to be applied. Perhaps most notably, a moving party
may—following the trilogy—establish a lack of material facts sufficient to warrant summary judgment without being required “to show
35
the absence of any disputed material fact.” Indeed, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett permits a grant of summary judgment where the moving party
shows that the non-moving party—bearing the burden of proof at tri36
al—cannot meet an essential element of his or her claim. While a
non-moving party may respond to such a showing by requesting addi37
tional time for discovery, establishing as much otherwise shifts the
burden to the non-moving party to defeat the motion by showing that
38
material issues of genuine fact do, in fact, exist.

31
32
33

34
35
36

37

38

398 U.S. 144, 148 (1970).
Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 779.
Wald, supra note 1, at 1907. Professor Friedenthal articulates an even broader reading of
the decision whereby a moving party would, under the Adickes regime, be required to
“comb through all the material available to see if there is something to be refuted even
though the responding party has never mentioned it in answers to interrogatories.” Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 778.
For a discussion of the background and facts of the cases, see Miller, supra note 3, at
1026–44.
Adickes, 398 U.S. at 148.
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting that summary judgment may be granted “against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) states that, in response to a party’s affidavit stating reasons it cannot
currently respond to a moving party’s summary judgment motion, a court may: “(1) deny
the [summary judgment] motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order.” This rule gives judges the authority to delay ruling on a summary judgment motion. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 n.20 (1998) (noting a
discretionary ability to “postpone ruling on a . . . summary judgment motion”).
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
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In addition to making “it easier to make the motion” via the Celotex burden-shifting framework, the 1986 trilogy also “increased the
39
chances that [summary judgment] will be granted.” For one, the
Court, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., held
that, although the summary judgment calculus is drawn by construing
40
all the evidence and inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a
court need not be blind to the facts adverse to the non-moving party.
Thus, summary judgment may be granted where the record as a
41
whole belies the evidence submitted by the non-moving party. Additionally, the Court, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., held that the
summary judgment standard is to be analyzed under the applicable
law governing the claim the jury would be deciding were the case to
42
proceed to trial. Accordingly, a non-moving party bearing a heavy
burden of proof at trial must provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find for them under the particular (heightened) trial burden.
While the increased functionality of summary judgment following
the 1986 trilogy has predictably resulted in a “dramatic reduction in
43
federal trials,” it is important to remember that, in deciding on a

39
40
41

42
43

Miller, supra note 3, at 1041.
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
See id. (noting that the non-moving party “must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary” where “the factual context renders [their] claim implausible”). Although much of the logic underlying the Matsushita decision plainly relates to its unique status as an antitrust case involving antitrust
law, Miller, supra note 3, at 1033, the general principle of considering the record in its totality has been applied in other contexts as well. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (citing Matsushita and rejecting non-moving party’s factual contentions because
they were “utterly discredited by the record”). Some have been critical of this approach,
however—at least with respect to factually driven inquiries. See George M. Dery III, The
Needless “Slosh” Through the “Morass of Reasonableness”: The Supreme Court’s Usurpation of Fact
Finding Powers in Assessing Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO. MASON. U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 417, 436–37 (2008) (criticizing the Scott Court for applying Matsushita in the Fourth
Amendment excessive force context). Some of the Justices on the Scott Court, in fact, expressed similar reservations with the Court’s approach. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 389–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Supreme Court colleagues as “jurors” throughout dissenting opinion). In any event, it is clear that, at a minimum, Matsushita is significant to
the extent that it departed from the “Court’s prior cautious approach to summary judgment in complex cases involving issues of motive and intent.” Miller, supra note 3, at
1033.
477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation
Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005). Professor Redish notes that “[c]hanges in the
law of summary judgment quite probably explain at least a large part of
the . . . reduction.” Id. Indeed, a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 2007
reports that summary judgment is granted in sixty percent of the roughly 29,000 suits in
which it is sought. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 3. Some, however, have opined
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summary judgment motion, the question the court asks is whether a
reasonable jury could possibly or rationally find for the non-moving
party when viewing the evidence (and drawing all inferences) in his
44
or her favor. Although the Matsushita decision could be construed
45
as limiting in some respects, the Court’s mandate that “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infer46
47
ences are to be drawn in his favor,” is not taken lightly. The implications of this rule are stark, because strict adherence to the standard
mandates denying summary judgment in every instance in which
48
there are disputes as to historical fact that could affect the legal outcome of the case. Professor Friedenthal nicely illustrates this point.
He asserts:
[I]f a defendant, who is charged with negligently driving into the plaintiff, moves on the basis of an affidavit that he was not driving at the time
in question, [the] plaintiff can defeat the motion with his own affidavit
that he saw defendant operating the car when the accident occurred.
Even if the responding party cannot produce evidence directly in support
of its case, it may still defeat summary judgment by producing sufficient
circumstantial evidence for a trier of fact to find in respondent’s favor. It
makes no difference in either situation how strong a case the defendant
presents. The court must assume, for purposes of the motion, that a trier
49
of fact would not believe any of the moving party’s witnesses.

Thus, the summary judgment standard affords a non-moving party
two ways to reach a jury, and that party’s mere say-so is not only permissible, but is in fact the easiest means of doing so.
While summary judgment may still be granted in the face of divergent factual allegations depending on the circumstances, the

44
45
46
47

48
49

that this trend predates the trilogy. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 591, 620 (2004) (noting that “empirical evidence . . . does not support the claims
of those who see a turning point in the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy” but instead “suggests that summary judgment started to assume a greater role in the 1970s”).
See, e.g., Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (holding that summary judgment was appropriate because
the relevant evidence precluded a rational jury from finding for the non-moving party).
See supra note 41.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59
(1970)).
See, e.g., T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting that “[i]f the nonmoving party produces direct evidence of a material fact,
the court may not assess the credibility of this evidence nor weigh against it any conflicting evidence presented by the moving party. The nonmoving party’s evidence must be taken as true.” (emphasis added)).
These types of disputes, as the Court has stated, are not uncommon. See supra note 15.
Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 781.
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50

prospects for this are necessarily limited. So, faithful adherence to
the summary judgment standard mandates routine denial of a defendant’s summary judgment motion where one party’s evidence contradicts another’s even if all the non-moving party brings in opposition to summary judgment is his or her own statement, as a witness to
51
the events in question, that the moving party is lying. Circumstantial
52
evidence suffices in this regard, too. Even so-called “meritless” cases, then, should proceed to a jury if the non-moving party has any
evidence that would allow a jury to reasonably find for him or her because the salient question is whether the non-moving party can meet
his or her burden of production—and not whether the case ulti53
mately has “merit.” Thus, preventing a case from proceeding to a
jury where the non-moving party meets this burden can violate the
Seventh Amendment.

50

51

52
53

One such circumstance is if the purported factual disputes are immaterial based on the
fact that the non-moving party does not have an actionable legal claim; this is akin to the
principles underlying a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion manifesting themselves at a later
stage in the litigation. The other possible circumstance in which summary judgment can
appropriately be granted in the face of legally significant factual contradictions is if the
non-moving party’s statements are directly contradicted by the record because, “[w]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). As explained supra note 41, some have been critical of this basis for granting summary judgment in the face of certain factual disputes.
While the rules governing summary judgment indicate that the non-moving party would
have to do so via means of admissible evidence, see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (noting opposing
affidavit must “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence”), some of the Court’s
language has suggested otherwise. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)
(stating that nonmoving party need not “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment”). Some courts have construed the
Celotex Court’s language to be merely “referring to the other means enumerated in Rule
56(c) for persuading the court that summary judgment is inappropriate including affidavits, which are evidence produced in a form that would not be admissible at trial.” Canada v. Blain’s Helicopters Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Others, however, have
“concluded that the Supreme Court meant that the nonmoving party could oppose a
summary judgment motion using unauthenticated documents.” Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651 (3d
Cir. 1986) and Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987) as examples of such decisions). For a collection of sources and a fuller explanation of the split in
authority, see James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1531 n.31, 1549 n.86 (1995).
See Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 781.
Except, of course, to the extent that “merit” is defined in terms of whether a jury could
reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 139 (noting that
summary judgment is utilized “extensively . . . to clear the federal docket of cases deemed
meritless”).
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B. The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial
Of course, the Seventh Amendment could only be violated by a
wrongful summary judgment grant in cases where there is a right to
jury trial in the first instance. As noted, the Seventh Amendment
“preserve[s]” the right to jury trial “[i]n Suits at common law, where
54
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” The limiting
phrase “at common law” denotes the fact that the right to jury trial
55
only extends to cases at law, and not to equitable or maritime suits.
The common law distinction between law and equity has eroded,
however, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for only one
56
form of action in the federal courts. So while the constitutional
right to jury trial is limited by its own language, the historical distinction upon which its limitations are based no longer exists.
Although the consequences of the merger of law and equity along
with the advent of untraditional causes of action have led to a rich
57
body of law governing whether a right to jury trial exists, this Com58
ment need not examine these principles at any length because it is
clear that Fourth Amendment excessive force cases are actions that
59
implicate the right to jury trial when they are for damages. It is,
54
55

56
57

58
59

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (noting that “[t]he phrase ‘common law,’ . . . is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence”).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
The Court has had to determine, for example, how to handle cases involving both legal
and equitable claims, and has held that legal claims must be heard first where both are
joined in the same suit. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11
(1959) (holding that “only under the most imperative circumstances . . . we cannot now
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination
of equitable claims” (footnote omitted)). This applies even if the legal claims are merely
incidental to the equitable claims. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962).
Further, the Court has articulated a three-pronged test for ascertaining whether a
right to trial by jury exists in cases that do not fit into the traditional “law” or “equity”
mold. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In Ross, the Court stated that the “premerger custom,” “the remedy sought” and “the practical abilities and limitations of juries”
were all factors worthy of consideration. Id. at 538 n.10. The Court reiterated these factors in Tull v. United States, but interestingly relegated the issue of the practical limitations
of juries to a footnote. 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987). However, the Court’s later decision
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996), expressly considered
this latter issue in a different context by holding that judges, and not juries, may determine the construction of patent claims.
Part III, infra, considers these issues more fully in discussing the relative importance of
the Seventh Amendment.
Excessive force suits are commonly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”).
Regardless of how such actions are brought, however, an excessive force suit is essentially
a tort claim, and is thereby accorded a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. See City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (explaining that “the Seventh
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however, worth noting that the Seventh Amendment right to jury tri60
al may be waived. Accordingly, the Seventh Amendment is neither
implicated nor violated where summary judgment is wrongfully
granted following a waiver of the right to trial by jury. With the limitations of the Seventh Amendment’s applicability to summary judgment grants in mind, this Comment turns to consider instructive cases.
II. WHY APPLICATION OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD MAY
VIOLATE THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN PRACTICE
Although Professor Thomas has put forth a strong and interesting
argument that summary judgment is, as a general matter, unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that it was never expressly accepted by the
61
Court nor a product of the English common law, this argument has
been handily rejected in the seemingly few cases in which it has been
62
raised. However, as the illustrative cases in this Part show, the standard is readily prone to distortion such that summary judgment may
sometimes be granted in contravention of its purported constitu63
tional basis.

60

61

62

63

Amendment jury guarantee extends to . . . claims unknown to the common law, so long
as the claims can be said to ‘soun[d] basically in tort,’ and seek legal relief” (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974))); see also Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional
Decision Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659, 661–62 n.8 (2006) (stating that
the Del Monte Dunes court accepted that excessive force suits for damages would “carry a
right to jury trial”).
Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that demand for jury trial be
made within ten days from when the last pleading “directed to the issue [was] served.”
Failure to make demand amounts to waiver. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a
jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed.”).
Thomas, supra note 11, at 139–40. More recently, Professor Thomas has argued that the
“reasonable jury” standard used to evaluate summary judgment, and other dispositive motions should be abandoned on other grounds. See infra note 63.
As of the writing of this Comment, only five federal Court of Appeals cases even remotely
address the merits of the constitutional argument. See Cook v. McPherson, 273 F. App’x
421, 425 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting constitutional argument opposing summary judgment); Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006) (same); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Rodriguez, 95 F.3d 54 (5th Cir. 1996)
(same); Malick v. Sandia Corp., 914 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990) (same).
As explained in Part I, summary judgment’s constitutionality in the face of the Seventh
Amendment is predicated on a lack of material facts to be tried. See supra notes 11–12
and accompanying text. Accepting this premise, Professor Thomas takes a more extreme
position than advanced in this Comment; she argues that the standard utilized is not
merely distorted in practice, but is—as a general matter—irreparably unconstitutional.
See Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009) (arguing that “reasonable jury” standard is a legal fiction that always involves judges unconstitutionally making fact determinations because (1) judges routinely weigh on the suffi-
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Because the selected cases all involve Fourth Amendment exces64
sive force claims, this Part proceeds by briefly considering the excessive force standard to be applied before turning to the cases themselves.
A. The Excessive Force Standard
65

Using a variety of means, plaintiffs may sue government officials
for the violation of constitutional rights and recover damages for the
excessive use of force. This particular civil remedy is rooted in the
66
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.
The
Court, in Graham v. Connor, broadly defined the test for excessive
force to involve a “careful balancing” between the individual and go67
vernmental interests involved. As the Court explained:
[I]ts proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
68
to evade arrest by flight.

The Court also clarified that, in undertaking this factually intensive
analysis, the lower courts were to judge whether force was excessive
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather
69
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Although this latter language serves to limit the scope of excessive
force liability, qualified immunity—which protects government officials from civil liability where their conduct does not violate “clearly
70
established” rights —has emerged as the true limitation on excessive
71
force liability. This is so because the Court, in the controversial de-

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

ciency of the evidence in assessing the reasonable jury standard, (2) the reasonable jury
standard has not been clearly defined, and (3) judges often disagree over what a reasonable jury could find).
See supra notes 14–17.
As noted supra note 59, Section 1983 provides such an avenue for relief.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989) (describing how to determine whether a particular use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (expressly rejecting lower court’s approach
of “deny[ing] summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim” because this approach would frustrate the policy goal of qualified immunity).
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72

cision of Saucier v. Katz, expressly mandated that qualified immunity
serve as a distinct step to the question of whether the Fourth
73
Amendment was violated at all.
While the Saucier Court rigorously distinguished qualified immu74
nity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force standard, it too is
ultimately factually intensive because it inquires as to whether “the of75
ficer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable.” Accordingly,
its practical benefit for defendant-officers is likely nominal in the
emblematic excessive force case described by Justice Scalia in Scott v.
76
Harris. Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg observed in concurrence in Saucier:
[I]f an excessive force claim turns on which of two conflicting stories best
captures what happened on the street, Graham will not permit summary
judgment in favor of the defendant official. And that is as it should be.
When a plaintiff proffers evidence that the official subdued her with a

72

73

74

75
76

Id. The Saucier decision was most readily criticized for mandating threshold consideration of the constitutional question prior to evaluating the applicability of qualified immunity. For a discussion of the salient criticisms, see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387–89
(2007) (Breyer, J., concurring). In January 2009, the Court overruled the fixed two-step
protocol that Saucier required, and invited lower courts to “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. While the “rigid ‘order of battle,’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019,
1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)), of Saucier is no longer compulsory, the Court noted in Pearson v. Calahan that it was still advisable in many cases. See
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (recognizing that the procedure set forth in Saucier is “often appropriate”). Choosing to follow the two-step Saucier order, whereby the constitutional
question serves as a threshold to the qualified immunity inquiry, could be seen as a boon
for plaintiffs who do not automatically have their cases dismissed following the pleading
stage on qualified immunity grounds—particularly since defendants invoking it, in some
circuits, bear the burden of proving the applicability of qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. See Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 2007) (identifying split in
authority over the burden of proving qualified immunity at trial). Indeed, at least in
these courts, obtaining dismissal via summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
may be difficult. See Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 774 (noting that “[o]ne would expect
summary judgment to be denied in nearly every action” where the moving party bore the
burden of proof at trial despite Justice Brennan’s suggestion in his Celotex dissent to the
contrary). But see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (noting that “summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate” where “the law did not put the officer on notice that his
conduct would be clearly unlawful”).
The Court expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding that, in excessive force cases, the
qualified immunity inquiry was tautological to the constitutional question under Graham,
490 U.S. 386, since both inquire into the officer’s objective reasonableness. See Saucier,
533 U.S. at 203 (describing the similarity observed by the Ninth Circuit as “superficial”).
This holding is undisturbed by Pearson.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
See supra note 15.
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chokehold even though she complied at all times with his orders, while
the official proffers evidence that he used only stern words, a trial must
77
be had. In such a case, the Court’s two step procedure is altogether inutile.

So, while a defendant has two means by which he or she could obtain summary judgment in response to a plaintiff’s excessive force
suit, a plaintiff’s say-so should generally be sufficient to get to a jury
where it reflects cognizable, affirmative evidence that a defendant78
officer acted (patently) unreasonably. It is unsurprising, then, that
courts have cautioned against using summary judgment in excessive
79
force suits.
But, as the cases that follow demonstrate, summary
judgment is still granted in excessive force cases where formalistic
adherence to the standard should lead to a jury trial.
B. Illustrative Cases
This Subpart proceeds by analyzing four illustrative excessive force
cases in detail. In each of the cases, summary judgment was granted
in the district court. The summary judgment grant was reversed in
80
two of the four cases, however, demonstrating the importance of
81
appellate oversight of summary judgment grants. Collectively, these
cases show the readiness with which summary judgment is granted in
82
the fact-specific excessive force inquiry —even in cases where evidence exists that could, at least arguably, prompt a reasonable jury to
83
find for the plaintiff under the applicable evidentiary standard.
1. Tapia v. City of Albuquerque
In Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, the plaintiff brought an excessive
force claim against several defendant-officers after he was placed in

77
78
79

80

81
82
83

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Of course, as noted supra note 50, there are
exceptions to this general rule.
See, e.g., Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “summary judgment . . . should be granted sparingly” in excessive force cases because they “nearly always
require[] a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom”).
Because appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo, the reviewing court applies
the same summary judgment test as the lower court. See infra note 94. Thus, the court of
appeals decisions affirming summary judgment lend independent support to the conclusions advocated in this Part.
See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
This is not meant to imply that the decisions discussed are representative of all federal
summary judgment cases which, of course, they are not.
It is worth noting that excessive force is one of several claims made in the cases discussed
in this Part.
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protective custody following an intoxicated suicide attempt.
Though he had not committed any crime and was not under arrest,
the plaintiff was brought to a prison facility to be housed while he so85
bered up.
In its opinion, the district court explained that the plaintiff had
been agitated throughout the encounter and insulted the officers
86
while they conducted a protective pat down at the prison facility.
The court noted that the plaintiff, in his deposition, claimed that the
officers initiated a “physical altercation” with him following his
87
(mere) insults. This account was corroborated by soundless video
evidence that showed the plaintiff being forcibly restrained and
88
handcuffed after speaking with the officers. Further, after being
handcuffed, the plaintiff was moved into a holding cell and—per his
89
deposition—thrown onto the floor, slapped and spit on.
The district court nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Reasoning that the intake area of the prison
was a “stressful, uncertain environment . . . in which officers may be
90
‘forced to make split-second judgments,’” the court noted that the
force used prior to moving the plaintiff into the holding cell was reasonable in light of the fact that the plaintiff “behaved arrogantly and
91
angrily in the moments leading up to the use of force.” The court
additionally held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity
92
with respect to the force utilized in moving the plaintiff to the cell
because he had suddenly fell along the way; this, as the court explained, could have been “interpreted . . . as an attempt at resis-

84
85
86
87
88

89
90
91

92

No. CIV 02-695 MCA/RLP, slip op. at 2–3 (D.N.M. June 2, 2003) [hereinafter Tapia I].
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. The plaintiff claimed in his deposition that he had been picked up by his neck during
this altercation, and the motion in opposition to summary judgment states that the video
also reflects as much. Plaintiff’s Response Brief to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 23, Tapia I, No. CIV 02-695 MCA/RLP. The plaintiff also claimed that he
was kneed in the back, a contention which the defendants argued was belied by the video.
Brief of Appellant at 15, Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 101 F. App’x 795 (10th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-2133) [hereinafter Tapia II].
Tapia I, No. CIV 02-695 MCA/RLP, slip op. at 6–7. The Court indicated that the defendants “den[ied] these contentions.” Id. at 7.
Id. at 12 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)).
Id. The Court also reasoned in the alternative that the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity because they could have reasonably believed the plaintiff would fight back
during the pat down. Id. at 14.
Although the Court makes no explicit mention of it in this context, presumably this language refers to the allegation that the defendants threw, slapped and spit on the plaintiff
in the holding cell.
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94

tance.” Applying de novo review, the district court’s grant of sum95
mary judgment was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
While the availability of video evidence in Tapia lends initial credibility to the court’s summary judgment grant in light of the Su96
preme Court’s recent holding in Scott v. Harris, in Tapia, unlike Scott,
97
there was some question as to the clarity of the video evidence. And,
interestingly, the plaintiff in Tapia used one of the videos from the
scene as supporting evidence in his motion opposing summary judg98
ment believing it corroborated his account of the facts. Further, the
video evidence did not capture anything that transpired in the holding cell in which the plaintiff claimed in his deposition to have been
99
thrown, hit and spit on while handcuffed and compliant. So, at its
essence, the question of whether the force utilized by the officers in
100
Tapia was “reasonable” or, alternatively, whether the officers made a
101
“reasonable mistake” boils down to whose story one accepts.
The plaintiff’s affirmative evidence showed that he suffered injuries relating to (1) being lifted in the air by his neck, (2) being kneed
in the back and (3) being thrown into a cell and struck. A jury could
reasonably find such force excessive in a case where the plaintiff was
102
not “resistant in any remotely threatening way” as the plaintiff
claimed in his testimony, given that the video evidence did not prove
93
94

95

96
97

98
99

100
101
102

Id. at 15.
Appellate review of a summary judgment grant is always de novo, and the district court’s
decision is thus afforded little, if any, weight in determining the appropriate conclusion.
See, e.g., T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting that, on appeal, the court applies the “same summary judgment test that
governs the district court’s decision”).
See Tapia II, 101 F. App’x 795, 800 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court largely
because the plaintiff “verbally confronted the defendants and pulled back from the booking counter while they were trying to frisk him”).
See supra note 41.
See Tapia II, 101 F. App’x at 796 (discussing the questions as to the clarity of the video
evidence utilized by the district court); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3–4, Tapia II, 101 F.
App’x 795 (No. 03-2133) (stating that the video submitted by the defendants was hazy,
and that the second video was clearer but did not “provide a definitive view of the incident[s] in question”); cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (holding summary
judgment appropriate because the “videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the
story told by [the plaintiff]” (emphasis added)).
See Tapia II, 101 F. App’x at 796 (noting that “Tapia . . . filed . . . video 2, as a part of his
response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment”).
See Plaintiff’s Response Brief to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 23, Tapia
I, No. CIV 02-695 MCA/RLP (stating that the plaintiff’s deposition testimony contradicts
the defendants’ summation of what the video shows and that there are divergent factual
allegations “as to what took place out of the sight of the camera”).
See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff, Tapia II, supra note 97, at 6–7.
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otherwise. Indeed, it is hard to envision that the insults the plaintiff
conceded to have lodged against the defendants merited, as a matter
of law, the use of such a high degree of force. Faithful adherence to
the summary judgment standard would have likely resulted in a jury
trial in this dispute over historical facts notwithstanding the video
evidence in the record. In short, the plaintiff seemingly met his burden of production such that a reasonable jury could find for him
103
when drawing all inferences in his favor.
2. Sowards v. City of Trenton
In Sowards v. City of Trenton, Terry Sowards’s estate brought suit af104
ter Sowards was shot dead by several police officers. The police had
been called to Sowards’s apartment complex after Sowards, a paranoid schizophrenic, was reported to have been engaged in a violent
105
altercation with another individual. After arriving on the scene, the
responding police officer identified Sowards walking into his apartment building and knocked on his door to request permission to
106
speak with him.
Sowards profanely declined, and three additional
107
police officers subsequently arrived at Sowards’s door.
The officers continued to request that Sowards open the door,
and Sowards continued to be non-responsive and profane in response
108
The officers thus decided to forcibly enter Soto their requests.
wards’s apartment; they kicked the door open, which as the court
noted, “resulted in the door opening up by approximately one
109
foot.” The officers testified in their depositions that, upon opening
the door, they saw a gun that fired at them, and that they returned
110
fire until the shooting ceased. The police report stated that the police had collectively fired thirty-nine shots, and that Sowards had
111
been hit seven times.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the excessive force claim because the “use of force . . . was not un112
constitutionally excessive.”
The court predicated this holding on

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
No. 02-CV-71899-DT, slip op. at 1 (D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2003),
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 18.
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the assumption that Sowards had a gun when the door was knocked
113
open. Viewed in this light, it did not matter who fired first because
the officers felt the need to utilize deadly force in responding to the
114
threat posed by Sowards.
Thus, no jury could reasonably find for
Sowards if it were granted that he had, in fact, aimed a gun at the officers.
Sowards did not concede, however, that a weapon was pointed at
115
the officers when they knocked the door down. While recognizing
that finding Sowards could have possibly not had a gun would create a
material factual issue for trial, the court held that Sowards had not
met his burden of production to prove as much at trial by characterizing the evidence to that effect as providing only a scintilla of support
116
for Sowards’s claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding, noting that the record belied Sowards’s account of the facts
because: (1) shell casings were found at the residence, (2) a handgun was found at the residence and (3) there were bullet holes from
117
the weapon alleged to have belonged to Sowards.
As discussed in Part I.A, summary judgment should be granted in
cases where the record as a whole demonstrates that no reasonable
jury could possibly find for the non-moving party. And, of course, a
supposed “scintilla” of evidence is insufficient to defeat summary
118
judgment where it is otherwise appropriate. Notwithstanding these
clear principles, it hardly seems evident that a reasonable jury could
not possibly find for Sowards when drawing all favorable inferences in
his favor.
Specifically, Sowards’s motion opposing summary judgment provided that: (1) Sowards’s sister and girlfriend had stated in their depositions that Sowards did not own a gun, was afraid of guns, and that
they had never seen one in his apartment; (2) Sowards’s fingerprints
were not on the gun alleged to have been his; (3) the gun was found
“a considerable distance” from Sowards’s body in the apartment; (4)
there was no blood on the gun which was, according to an expert,
unusual if Sowards was holding a gun during the encounter; and (5)
ballistics tests adduced showed the bullets purportedly fired by So-

113
114
115

116
117
118

Id.
Id.
See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Sowards, No.
02-CV-71899-DT (arguing that the question of whether Sowards had a gun was highly disputed).
Sowards, No. 02-CV-71899-DT, at 20–21.
Sowards v. City of Trenton, 125 F. App’x 31, 38 (6th Cir. 2005).
Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 782.
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wards from his apartment could have come from another room in the
119
building.
Ironically, then, and in direct contradiction to the conclusions
reached by the district court and court of appeals, Sowards’s counsel
characterized the dispute as a matter of whether to believe “the four
120
officers versus the substantially contradicting physical evidence.”
However, the divergence in how the court, which opted to grant
summary judgment with respect to the excessive force claim, and Sowards’s counsel characterized the facts is hardly surprising. Sowards’s
counsel believed that the circumstantial evidence adduced, when
viewed favorably to the plaintiff, created a strong jury case while the
court did not.
But while the defendants’ evidence—that of the only surviving
witnesses from the scene and physical circumstantial evidence pointing in favor of the defendants’ account—seems, on balance, stronger
than the plaintiff’s, can it really be said that a jury could not find in
favor of the plaintiff if it did “not believe any of the moving party’s
121
122
Probably not.
So, if nothing else, Sowitnesses [or evidence?]”
wards is a close enough case to be construed as a weak application of
the summary judgment standard.
3. Bender v. Monroe Township
123

In Bender v. Monroe Township, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Bender, sued several police officers for excessive force following a police
response to a domestic dispute. The police officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The police had been
summoned to the plaintiffs’ home by the plaintiffs’ daughter. The
call involved screaming and pleas for help, indicating that Mr. Bend124
er had struck Mrs. Bender.

119
120
121
122

123
124

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 115, at 12–
13.
Id. at 13.
Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 781.
Cf. Wilhelm v. Knox County, No. 2:03-CV-786, 2005 WL 1126817, at *15 (S.D. Ohio May
12, 2005) (denying summary judgment as to excessive force claim “[a]lthough cognizant
of the lack of much detail in [the] evidence” because “the evidence presents a scenario in
which the force used by [the officer] may or may not have been appropriate and, resolving all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court must conclude that [the
plaintiff’s] claim survives summary judgment”).
No. 05-cv-216, 2007 WL 836865 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Bender I].
Id. at *1.
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At least three police officers arrived on the scene. Upon arrival,
they observed Mrs. Bender and one of her daughters standing out126
Mrs. Bender informed the officers
side of their locked residence.
that Mr. Bender was in the home with the couple’s other two daughters, “and asked the Officers to enter the house by breaking down the
127
front door.”
Before they did so, Mr. Bender briefly opened the
door voluntarily, but immediately closed it upon observing the police
officers. The officers informed Mr. Bender that he was under arrest
through the door, and demanded he open the door for them. He re128
fused to do so.
As the district court explained, the parties’ accounts of what transpired next differ considerably:
Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Bender raised both of his empty hands in the air
[and] that Mr. Bender was tackled without provocation by the Officers.
Plaintiffs further claim that the Officers assaulted Mr. Bender both inside
the house and on the front yard when they were transporting him to a
patrol car. . . . Defendants claim that when they entered Plaintiffs’ residence, Mr. Bender took a ‘boxer’s stance’ and held an Allen wrench in a
threatening manner. Defendants also claim that Mr. Bender resisted ar129
rest, which compelled them to forcefully detain him.

While the plaintiffs ascribed Mr. Bender’s alleged injury—a broken
face bone—to the defendants’ actions, the defendants claimed any
injuries resulted from Mr. Bender “repeatedly hitting his face against
the partition in the patrol car in a fit of rage, and hitting his face
130
against a table in the house while he was resisting arrest.”
Despite the vast differences in the accounts of the respective parties, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the de131
fendants. It predicated its holding on the fact that Mr. Bender had
(1) refused to allow the officers to enter after being placed under ar132
rest, and (2) pled guilty to assaulting a police officer. These facts, it
suggested, precluded a reasonable jury from finding that the force
utilized by the police was excessive in relation to that reasonably nec133
essary under the circumstances. Therefore, it found it unnecessary

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

The plaintiffs alleged a fourth officer had been present, but the defendants denied this
contention. Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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to address the second-step question of whether the officers would be
134
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.
That Mr. Bender had resisted arrest before the officers entered
the home and that he had pled guilty to assault on an officer should
not have been grounds for granting summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, however. It is certainly unlikely that Mr. Bender, who
135
was engaged in a drunken altercation with his family and vehemently resisted arrest before the police broke down the door, suddenly “surrendered” and was fully compliant once the police entered
136
his residence.
But while Mr. Bender likely resisted arrest—thereby
warranting some degree of force—and would likely lose before a jury
based on the (therefore) dubious factual claims his case necessarily
rested on, the fact remains that the jury could find for him if it believed the plaintiffs’ account of the facts rather than the defendants’.
Indeed, the plaintiffs’ characterized the defendants’ actions in
their court briefing as “[b]eating a handcuffed and injured individual
137
who [was] offering no resistance.” They corroborated this account
by attaching their own depositions, along with those of their daugh138
ters who were present during the incident.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict notwithstanding the defendants’ qualified immunity defense, because
the officers could not possibly have believed their mistake as to the
degree of force was “reasonable” if the plaintiffs’ account of the facts
139
was true.
Recognizing as much, the Third Circuit reversed the district
140
court, and remanded for further proceedings.
The court noted
that the “depositions of family members support[ed] Mr. Bender’s
134
135
136

137
138
139

140

Id. at *4 n.6. When Bender I was decided, the two-step protocol of Saucier was compulsory.
See supra note 72.
See Bender v. Twp. of Monroe, 289 F. App’x 526, 527 (3d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Bender
II] (noting that the domestic dispute began when Mr. Bender was drunk).
Mr. Bender conceded to the Third Circuit that he, after being handcuffed, “kicked an
officer in the groin.” Id. The extent to which this renders the force utilized by the officers “reasonable,” however, hinges on whether or not Mr. Bender was beaten to the degree he alleged and averred via deposition testimony. That is, the mere fact that Mr.
Bender physically assaulted an officer would not mean that any degree of force utilized in
response would be appropriate under excessive force analysis. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement at 6, Bender I, 2007 WL 836865
(No. 05-cv-216).
Id.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Indeed, the possibility of a summary judgment
grant in a case with facts analogous to those in Bender seems to be exactly what concerned
Justice Ginsburg in Saucier.
Bender II, 289 F. App’x at 529.
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version of the [facts]” and that the district court should thus have “al141
lowed a jury to determine which version [was] to be believed.”
The Third Circuit’s decision in Bender II reflects the functionality
142
Aland continued vitality of the summary judgment standard.
though the plaintiffs had a weak jury case, the Third Circuit appropriately recognized that the record’s disputed historical facts presented a scenario in which a reasonable jury could, contrary to the
district court’s holding, find for the plaintiffs. By reversing the district court’s summary judgment grant, the Third Circuit implicitly
recognized (and reaffirmed) the premium the Constitution continues to place on providing litigants their day before the jury.
4. Gonzalez v. City of Santa Monica
143

Finally, Gonzalez v. City of Santa Monica involved an altercation
between several police officers and the plaintiff. While the reported
144
account of the facts that gave rise to the suit is necessarily limited,
discussion of the case in this Part is warranted because Gonzalez represents the type of case alluded to in Part I.A. whereby a plaintiff seeks
to defeat a defendant’s summary judgment motion exclusively on the
145
basis of his or her say-so.
The plaintiff in Gonzales sued for excessive force, alleging that
the police (1) sprayed him in the face with pepper spray, (2) beat
him with a baton and (3) pulled his hair and arm during an encoun146
ter in which they arrested his brother.
The police denied these
contentions and moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
147
of the officers.
In a cursory opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Noting that the
district court had erroneously “resolved virtually all material disputes
in favor of the officers,” the court held that summary judgment was
148
inappropriate with respect to the excessive force claim. Specifically,
it noted that the plaintiff’s account of the facts—supported solely by
141
142
143
144

145
146
147
148

Id. at 528.
Cf. Thomas, supra note 63, at 759–60 (suggesting that the “reasonable jury” standard used
to weigh on summary judgment motions is fatally flawed).
88 F. App’x 161 (9th Cir. 2004).
The district court’s opinion in Gonzalez is unreported, and—unfortunately—unavailable
as a slip opinion. Accordingly, all discussion of this case relates to the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion which handily reversed the district court. Id. at 163.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Gonzalez, 88 F. App’x at 162.
Id.
Id.
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his own affidavit—entailed him being beaten by the officers for essentially no reason, and that a jury could thus find excessive force had
149
As the Court exbeen utilized if it believed the plaintiff at trial.
plained:
In his affidavit, Gonzalez states, among other things, that although he was
shouting at the officers to put their guns away, he at no time touched an
officer or otherwise interfered with the arrest of his brother. He further
states . . . that Officer Legerski sprayed him in the face with pepper spray,
and that Officer Carranza beat him on the leg and knee with his baton
while Officer Bickler pulled his hair and Officer Lucio pulled him by his
150
arm.

This account of the facts, as the court noted, precluded the qualified immunity defense and rendered the district court’s summary
151
judgment grant inappropriate. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found it irrelevant, for summary judgment purposes, that the evidence adduced
in opposition to summary judgment was the plaintiff’s own testimony;
it, unlike the district court, properly assumed the plaintiff’s story was
the true one when weighing whether to grant the defendants’ sum152
mary judgment motion.
C. Summary Judgment in the Selected Cases
The rules associated with summary judgment are easy to state, but
application of the standard is necessarily complex, as it involves a legal determination about a set of facts. This characteristic makes the
standard malleable in factually intensive cases, and provides an avenue by which judges can conceivably frame the summary judgment
question in terms of the strength of a claim rather than the presence
or absence of material factual issues. Such efforts, however, are not
necessarily deliberate distortions of the standard. Indeed, judges may
perceive the standard to provide a legally appropriate basis by which
to deprive litigants of the right to jury trial in cases where the summary judgment standard would—strictly speaking—not permit as
153
much. The summary judgment grants discussed in this Part all re-

149
150
151
152

153

Id. at 162–63.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
This decision, like the Third Circuit’s holding in Bender II, 289 F. App’x 526 (3d Cir.
2008), shows that the summary judgment standard, although subject to improper application, ultimately remains functional.
This perspective would be the manifestation of the “extreme” pro-summary judgment
position that has survived the Frank-Clark debate. See supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
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flect the consequences of doing so—namely, the loss of the right to a
154
jury trial where there would otherwise be a right to one.
Moreover, the fact that the cases surveyed involve summary judgment grants in favor of defendant-police officers does not prompt any
sample-bias concerns. The propriety of the summary judgment stan155
dard in light of the Seventh Amendment—which I, unlike others,
156
continue to believe is possible —depends on the ability of a jurist
weighing a summary judgment motion to objectively determine
whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party by ref157
erence to that party’s burden of production. Thus, while the summary judgment grants in the cases surveyed may reflect generalized
deference to police officers, the extent to which they do lends support to the conclusion that the summary judgment standard was im158
properly applied.
When the standard is distorted to deprive liti-

154

155
156
157
158

It is worth noting that the cases surveyed—and the vast majority of those considered for
discussion in this Part—are non-precedential opinions. Some have noted a propensity for
such opinions to create inconsistencies in the law. See Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process
State-Created Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006) (noting that
the Third Circuit “created inconsistent non-precedential opinions” on a particular legal
doctrine in a six-year interval between binding decisions on that doctrine).
There are precedential opinions that support the arguments advanced in this Part,
too. In Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1997), a divided court granted summary
judgment for the defendants on fairly tenuous grounds. The Colston court granted summary judgment where an unarmed black plaintiff was shot in the back, reasoning that the
defendants’ behavior was objectively reasonable because the officers could have believed
the plaintiff posed an “imminent danger of serious bodily harm.” Id. at 100. The dissenting judge argued, however, that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff given that he
had no weapon during the encounter with the officers and only inflicted minimal injuries
upon them after they had—viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—
unnecessarily provoked an altercation with him. Id. at 103 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Discussing the case at length as an example of the liberalized approach some courts take to
summary judgment, Professor Miller criticizes the Colston court’s “questionable” treatment of the summary judgment standard, pointing to the vastly different conclusions
reached by the majority, who determined that no reasonable jury could find the officers
to have acted unreasonably by firing shots at the plaintiff, and the dissent who reached
the exact opposite conclusion. See Miller, supra note 3, at 1131 (explaining that “the clear
disagreement among ‘reasonable people’ . . . suggests that . . . the merits should have
been left until trial”).
See generally Thomas, supra note 63, at 774–83 (arguing that it is impossible for a judge to
apply the reasonable jury standard without offending the Constitution).
See supra notes 142 and 152 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
While qualified immunity would ordinarily justify this kind of deference, it would not do
so in cases where—as in the cases surveyed in this Part—the disputes as to historical fact
are vast and material. See supra note 77.
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gants of their jury trial right in this manner, its purportedly settled
159
constitutional basis is vastly weakened.
This is not to say, of course, that there is an absolute right to trial
by jury in all excessive force suits. This Comment has focused exclusively on cases in which there were disputes as to historical facts.
Where the disputes are material in such cases, the Seventh Amendment unquestionably provides the right to a jury trial that this Com160
ment has argued was erroneously deprived in the illustrative cases.
Whether the jury is entitled to determine the factually driven excessive force question when the parties agree on the facts giving rise to
the suit is an altogether different question, the resolution of which is
a subject for a different article.
It suffices to note, then, that some courts have adamantly rejected
the traditional view that “reasonableness” tests are fundamentally for
161
162
the jury to decide in the excessive force context. Thus, although
an excessive force claim hinges on a factually intensive objective reasonableness standard, it is not necessarily the case that the Seventh
Amendment categorically provides a jury trial right. Accordingly, a
judge may well be entitled to determine whether an officer acted
“reasonably” or not in cases different than those discussed in this
Comment. Although the Constitution plainly does not contemplate
163
such a role for judges in the cases this Comment focuses on, it is
nevertheless worth considering how efficiency concerns bear on the
issue of disposing weak jury cases via summary judgment. This
Comment thus turns to address this question.

159
160
161
162

163

See supra note 11.
See, e.g., Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When material facts are in dispute [in an excessive force suit], then the case must go to a jury . . . .”).
See Struve, supra note 59, at 704 (explaining that reasonableness tests in tort law traditionally “go to the jury even in the absence of a dispute of historical fact”).
See, e.g., Bell, 321 F.3d at 640 (distinguishing between constitutional torts and ordinary
torts, and explaining that the former creates “legal rules” such that “when material
facts . . . are undisputed” the question of liability is outside the jury’s permissible ambit).
For a brief analysis of the Bell court’s conclusion, see Struve, supra note 59, at 705–06. For
a more general survey of cases from the different circuits discussing the role of the judge
vis-à-vis the jury in resolving excessive force suits with undisputed historical facts, see Karen M. Blum, Section 1983: Qualified Immunity, in 1 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: 25TH
ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 750–819 (2008).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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III. COULD UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT STANDARD BE JUSTIFIED ON POLICY GROUNDS?
As advanced in Part II, summary judgment has the capacity to be
granted inappropriately, thereby violating the Seventh Amendment.
While it is difficult to ascertain precisely why summary judgment is
sometimes granted in the face of material factual disputes, it stands to
reason that inappropriate grants are sometimes utilized for docket164
clearing purposes.
Given the Seventh Amendment interests at
stake, this concern has prompted some to conclude that “appellate
supervision of the motion’s administration seems especially appropriate to prevent Rule 56 from becoming an inappropriate docketclearing mechanism or a way of preempting trial and jury determina165
tion.”
On the other hand, a strong (if unconstitutional) argument could
be lodged against allowing “losing” cases to proceed to trial when
there are material factual disputes. While adjudicating such cases at
the summary judgment stage would unquestionably violate a constitu166
tional right, the Seventh Amendment is not, as a general matter, sa167
crosanct. Indeed, the Seventh Amendment can be easily waived,
does not—unlike almost all of its counterparts in the Bill of Rights—
168
apply against the states, and is fundamentally limited in terms of its
169
applicability.

164

165
166
167
168

169

In Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998), for example, Judge Easterbrook recognized that summary judgment and other pre-trial adjudication procedures made sense
as a matter of judicial economy given the burdens of the federal judicial docket. He
noted, “Pressure from the flux of cases makes early disposition of weak claims attractive,
freeing judicial time for others that appear to have superior prospects.” Id. at 519.
Miller, supra note 3, at 1041–42.
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 78 (2008) (noting that the Seventh Amendment was never incorporated against the states while “almost all of the rest of the Bill of
Rights” were).
As mentioned, supra note 57, complexity is a potential grounds for depriving a litigant of
a jury trial. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the Seventh Amendment
does not provide a right to jury fact-finding in the complex determinations of patent construction. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). The discussion, supra notes 160–62, concerning whether a judge or jury should determine whether a
defendant’s force was excessive in cases of undisputed historical fact can be seen as a manifestation of this limitation. For a broader discussion of how issue complexity impacts
the Seventh Amendment jury trial right, see George K. Chamberlin, Complexity of Civil Action as Affecting Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by Jury, 54 A.L.R. FED. 733 (1981).
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Viewed in this light, principles of judicial economy make it easy to
comprehend why there may be a proclivity to enter docket-clearing
170
summary judgment grants in weak jury cases. Every destined-to-lose
litigant who gets to a jury delays the ability of those with legitimate
suits to proceed with respect to their claims whilst burdening the
171
courts.
This is particularly true given that, in some circuits, summary judgment may be denied even though it is technically appropriate because this discretion affords cautious district judges an avenue
172
to avoid reversal by routinely denying summary judgment.
Ultimately, however, compromising constitutional rights for effi173
Especially in light of
ciency’s sake is an unconstitutional solution.
the Court’s treatment of suits involving mixed questions of law and
174
equity, which implies a preference for jury trial. So while it is easy
to be sympathetic to judges who dispose of (seemingly) frivolous suits
175
that technically have “genuine issue[s] as to . . . material fact[s,]”
the policy justifications for doing so are not, and cannot be, sufficient
grounds to overcome a constitutional requirement—albeit one that is
176
Judges should thererelatively less “important” than many others.
170
171

172
173

174

175
176

A more liberalized standard could also be construed as warranted by principles of judicial
economy.
While noting that “summary judgment should never be viewed as simply a docket-clearing
device,” Judge Scheindlin has pointed out the extent to which meritless cases proceeding
past the summary judgment stage burden the courts and other parties. Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813, 846
(1999). Judge Scheindlin stated that “courts cannot ignore the fact that the delay caused
by the trial of a meritless claim works an injustice upon other parties awaiting a trial
date.” Id. On the other hand, it seems equally plausible that—in some cases—it may be
more cumbersome for a court to write an opinion granting summary judgment than to
try the case by jury.
See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 9, at 104 (describing the split in authority over
whether summary judgment grants are discretionary).
The Court expressly noted as much in another context when it struck down the legislative
veto as constitutionally impermissible. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (explaining that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government . . . will not save it if
it is contrary to the Constitution”).
As noted, supra note 57, the Court has required legal claims be tried before equitable
claims in cases where legal and equitable claims are joined. In expounding this rule
based on the need to “preserve jury trial,” the Court noted that the “right to jury trial is a
constitutional one . . . while no similar requirement protects trials by the court.” Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
I derive the conclusion that the right may be less important than other constitutional
rights from the fact that the right to jury trial (1) can be easily waived, (2) has not been
incorporated against the states and (3) does not apply by virtue of complexity in certain
contexts. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. Commentators have reached
similar conclusions. See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 755, 793 n.186 (2004) (describing the Seventh Amendment as a “weak
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fore be cautious in deciding a summary judgment motion, bearing in
mind the rights that could be violated by making the wrong decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment standard has evolved considerably since
its inception, and the liberalization of the 1986 trilogy has transformed its previously weaker role into a powerful pre-trial tool for
federal judges. While neatly defined and easy to state, summary
judgment is fundamentally prone to distortion because it is ultimately
a legal conclusion about a set of facts. This is particularly true in factually driven inquiries where judges must determine whether a jury
could “reasonably” find a particular party’s behavior “unreasonable”
(or the like).
In applying this test in the excessive force context, courts have, at
least occasionally, granted summary judgment in seemingly weak cases where strict adherence to the standard would likely result in a different outcome. Given the interests associated with the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury, such efforts amount to a violation
of a constitutional right. While there are surely important efficiency
considerations that militate in favor of granting summary judgment
in such cases, the Seventh Amendment is ultimately paramount. Recognizing as much is an important step towards ensuring that summary judgment’s settled constitutional basis is not compromised.

guarantee”); see also Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1107 (1999) (“[T]he Court treats the Seventh Amendment as if it is
less important than the other rights found in the Bill of Rights . . . .”).

